De Beers’ sales value fell this month as global rough demand weakened and the miner reduced prices of its larger stones.
Proceeds dropped 32% year on year to $450 million at 2023’s fifth sales cycle from $657 million in the equivalent period a year earlier, De Beers reported Wednesday. Sales declined 6% compared with the $479 million that the fourth cycle brought in. The total included the June sight as well as auction sales.
“Following the JCK [Las Vegas] show, and with ongoing global macroeconomic challenges continuing to impact end-client sentiment, the diamond industry remains cautious heading into summer,” said De Beers CEO Al Cook. “Reflecting this, we saw demand for De Beers rough diamonds during the fifth sales cycle of the year slightly softer than in the fourth cycle.”
De Beers lowered prices at the sight by 5% to 10% mainly in 2-carat categories and larger, as well as for some 1- to 1.5-carat items, market insiders said. It also extended its buyback program, which allows sightholders to sell goods back to the miner following the purchase.
This reflected weakness in the rough that produces polished above 0.30 carats, and especially the stones that yield 1-carat finished diamonds. These sizes are especially weak in the US market amid economic uncertainty and a lull in engagements, dealers explained. Rough under 0.75 carats has seen a mild recovery as Indian manufacturers look to fill their factories with low-cost material.
The Group of Seven (G7) meeting that took place in Japan in mid-May proved to be an anticlimax for the diamond trade.
The industry had expected a major announcement to come from the meeting relating to required declarations on the origin of diamonds imported to those countries — an additional measure that would help prevent polished diamonds sourced from Russian-origin rough entering their markets.
While a clear guideline did not emerge, the member nations — Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States — pledged to work toward such measures.
“In order to reduce the revenues that Russia extracts from the export of diamonds, we will continue to restrict the trade in and use of diamonds mined, processed or produced in Russia,” the group said after the meeting.
As it stands, the US and the UK have implemented bans on diamonds sourced directly from Russia. However, the sanctions don’t account for “substantial transformation,” and consequently the manufacturing center is regarded as the source. For example, diamonds polished in Belgium, India, Israel or the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from Russian rough can technically be imported to the US.
Implementing such detailed declarations is proving more complicated than originally thought. Creating such mechanisms will take time, as Feriel Zerouki, the De Beers executive who heads the World Diamond Council (WDC), said in a recent panel discussion at the JCK Las Vegas show in early June. These measures would apply to the entire industry, seemingly requiring a disclosure of origin for all diamonds at customs.
“How do we support the [sanctions] without paralyzing the industry and making it very cumbersome for natural diamonds to enter the G7 countries,” Zerouki challenged the Las Vegas audience.
Setting standards It’s a sensitive point for an already heavily audited industry, and for companies in each segment of the supply chain that would bear the added expense of verifying such information.
It’s also worth noting that the G7 cannot enact such requirements as a bloc. It will be left to each country to implement its own import rules. That said, there does at least seem to be an effort among those countries to apply some consistency in their systems. It was an open secret that members of various governments and industry bodies met in Las Vegas during the show to advance these discussions, which presumably covered a wide spectrum of industry-related issues.
Central to the talks must surely be the practicality of such declarations. What mechanisms are available to the industry that would facilitate traceability? And who verifies that these initiatives meet the required standards? And on what are those standards based?
The trade has at its disposal industry structures as well as company programs that tackle the challenge of traceability and source verification — although arguably nothing is foolproof.
De Beers’ Lightbox lab-grown diamond brand is trialing sales of engagement rings, marking a major shift for the company, which previously insisted synthetic stones were not a product for important milestones.
The retailer is publicizing lab-grown diamond engagement rings on its home page, promising a “stress-free and risk-free” shopping experience. “Our cutting-edge technology ensures each of our lab-grown diamonds are quality guaranteed,” the site reads, with the marketing line: “Because great chemistry deserves great chemistry.”
A link takes viewers to a page listing 16 items featuring regular Lightbox lab-grown diamonds, or stones from the brand’s Finest line, which have higher color and clarity. The standard collection usually sells for $800 per carat plus the cost of the setting, while Finest retails at $1,500 per carat. The selection includes white, pink and blue stones, with prices ranging from $500 for a three-stone ring to $5,000 for 2 carats.
Lightbox was unavailable for comment on Sunday, but told Women’s Wear Daily (WWD) and JCK it was running “a small in-market test of consumer preferences in the lab-grown diamond engagement ring segment.”
When De Beers launched Lightbox in 2018, Bruce Cleaver, the miner’s CEO at the time, presented lab-grown as a product that “may not be forever, but is perfect for right now,” claimed there was “no real emotional value in lab-grown diamonds, because they’re not unique,” and said the stones did not warrant grading. It later debuted the Finest line, introduced stones larger than 1 carat, and started declaring the cut quality, color and clarity of its stones.
Anglo American plc announces the value of rough diamond sales (Global Sightholder Sales and Auctions) for De Beers’ fourth sales cycle of 2023, amounting to US$480 million.
The provisional rough diamond sales figure quoted for Cycle 4 represents the expected sales value for the period 1 and 16 May and remains subject to adjustment based on final completed sales.
Al Cook, CEO of De Beers, said:
“Sales of our rough diamonds in the fourth sales cycle of the year saw a small decrease from the previous cycle as the industry has entered what is traditionally a seasonally quieter period. Rough diamond demand was also influenced by ongoing macroeconomic uncertainty and a slower pace of recovery in consumer demand from China than was widely anticipated.”
Botswana may not renew a five-decade sales agreement with De Beers if the diamond producer doesn’t offer a larger share of rough diamonds to the state’s gem trading company, Okavango Diamond Company (ODC).
The move comes after the southern Africa nation acquired last month a 24% stake in Belgian diamond processing firm HB Antwerp for an undisclosed sum.
Analysts saw this deal as a way for Botswana to loosen the Anglo American-owned miner’s grip on its diamond sector, which is a major source of employment and tax revenue for the country.
De Beers and Botswana jointly own Debswana, which mines almost all of the roughs gems in the country — the world’s second-largest diamond producing nation after Russia.
The partnership has helped Botswana become one of Africa’s fastest growing economies, while supplying De Beers 75% of Debswana’s rough diamonds, which are then sorted and sold to sightholders around the world.
Debswana’s diamond sales hit a record $4.6 billion in 2022, compared to $3.4 billion in 2021.
President Mokgweetsi Masisi has threatened to walk away from the talks if Botswana does not get a larger share of Debswana’s output for marketing outside the De Beers system.
The government has not publicly stated what share it seeks, but it is believed to be as high as 50%, double its current allocation.
The two parties have been negotiating for several years to extend their 2011 mining rights and sales agreement, which is due to expire in June this year.
“Colonial” model Rafael Papismedov, co-founder of HB Antwerp, told the Financial Times that a revised deal would help Botswana break free from the current model of being “stuck in a box that says you can only dig and wash the diamonds.”
Papismedov added that De Beers’ operating model carries on “colonization” principles, acting as if Botswana was incapable of building midstream capabilities for polishing diamonds.
Masisi wants more locals employed in the diamond sector, which accounts for a fifth of the country’s gross domestic product.
The largest diamond producer by value has said it is confident that it can maintain its partnership with Botswana, but that some of the negotiations are complex and require more time.
De Beers has said that the arrangement must make economic and strategic sense for both parties, adding that it is committed to supporting Botswana’s aspirations to grow its diamond industry.
The stakes are high for both sides, as they seek to secure their future in a volatile and competitive industry that has been hit by the covid-19 pandemic, changing consumer preferences and ethical concerns.
A new deal between Botswana and De Beers could have significant implications for the global diamond supply chain and the balance of power in the sector.
De Beers, the largest diamond producer by value, has unveiled a unique piece it named the “Beating Heart”, a 0.33-carat rough specimen that consists of a diamond within another diamond.
The unusual discovery – a D-colour, type IaAB diamond – has an internal cavity enclosing a smaller loose diamond, which is trapped, yet free to move around within the space.
De Beers said the gemstone was discovered at one of its mines in either Africa or Canada, but the exact origins can’t be pinpointed.
It arrived at the De Beers Institute of Diamonds facility in Maidenhead, England, in November last year, where it was verified to be a natural occurring stone.
Initial conclusions from the Institute’s experts suggest that an intermediate layer of poor-quality diamond etched away during its travel to the surface of the Earth, leaving only the better-quality material: the outer diamond and the core.
“The ‘Beating Heart’ is a remarkable example of what can happen on the natural diamond journey from formation to discovery,” Jamie Clark, Head of Global Operations at De Beers Institute of Diamonds, said in the statement.
Now registered on De Beers’ Tracr blockchain platform, which certifies a diamond’s provenance and production journey, the “Beating Heart” will be kept in its rough form for research and educational purposes.
Competitor Alrosa found a similar diamond in 2019, which was named “Matryoshka” after the famous Russian nesting dolls. The 0.62 carat gem, estimated to be over 800 million years old, resulted from one diamond growing inside another, according to Alrosa’s scientists.
De Beers has increased prices of small rough diamonds for the second consecutive sight as a combination of demand and supply factors continue to create a hot market for the category.
Prices for tiny stones rose by around 10% on average at this week’s trading session, with sharper advances in certain segments, customers and insiders estimated Monday. The changes were mainly for minus-7 sieve sizes, which weigh about 0.03 carats, across a range of qualities. De Beers was unavailable for comment.
The February sale runs this week from Monday to Friday in Gaborone, Botswana.
Rough under 0.75 carats became a sought-after asset in the second half of 2022 as melee demand from luxury brands strengthened and Indian manufacturers needed cheaper material to fill factories amid thin profit margins. In addition, Western sanctions on Russian diamonds created a mixture of real and perceived shortages in those sizes, for which Alrosa is the biggest supplier. The trade is watching for potential further restrictions as the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine approaches.
“Are people preempting what the [new] measures might be on Russia? [The strong market] might have to do with that,” a rough-market participant told Rapaport News on condition of anonymity.
Last year, De Beers made only modest increases in the prices of smalls, even when the segment saw robust demand, a sightholder explained on condition of anonymity. The miner raised prices at last month’s sight by approximately 10% — alongside decreases in the slower, larger goods.
The fresh hikes caught many dealers by surprise, as they were expecting De Beers to monitor the Chinese recovery before making further price adjustments.
Botswana’s President Mokgweetsi Masisi warned Sunday that his country could sever ties with South African diamond giant De Beers if talks to renegotiate a sales agreement prove unfavorable for his country.
The 2011 sales agreement governing the terms of marketing diamonds produced by Debswana – a 50-50 joint venture between the government and De Beers – expired in 2021.
It has been extended by the parties, who cited the coronavirus outbreak as the reason for the delay in concluding negotiations, and will end on June 30, 2023.
Speaking at a rally of his ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) in his home village of Moshupa, about 65 kilometers from the capital Gaborone, Masisi warned, “If we don’t reach a win-win situation, each side will have to pack up and go home.”
Under the 2011 agreement, the mining company De Beers received 90% of the rough diamonds produced while Botswana, Africa’s largest diamond producer, received 10%. In 2020, Botswana’s share was increased to 25%.
In 2020, Botswana’s share was increased to 25%.
Today, “we got a glimpse of how the diamond market works, and we found out that we received less than we should have,” said Mr. Masisi, who spoke in both English and the local language, Tswana.
“We also found out that our diamonds are bringing in a lot of profit and that the (2011) agreement had not been favorable to us,” he added, before warning: “We want a bigger share of our diamonds. Business cannot continue as before.
Angola is aiming for a dual listing for state-owned diamond miner Endiama, reported Reuters citing Angola Mines Minister.
The country initially plans an initial public offering for a stake between 5% and 10% in the company on the Angolan stock exchange, following which it will seek a secondary foreign listing.
This move forms part of the OPEC member country’s efforts to reform and privatise the economy, including a partial listing of national oil company Sonangol.
Russian diamond mining company Alrosa has a joint venture with Endiama in Angola.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year, sanctions were imposed by Western nations on several companies, including Alrosa, subsequently impacting Endiama’s operations.
Angola Minister of Mineral Resources, Oil and Gas Diamantino Azevedo told the news agency on the sidelines of a mining conference in Cape Town: “Sanctions are there and there is some impact.”
Azevedo said the government is considering measures required to avoid impacts on diamond production.
The minister noted that the government, however, could go ahead with an initial public offering for Endiama following its restructuring.
Azevedo said: “Our goal is (to list) till 30% but will start maybe with five or 10%.”
According to Endiama’s document at the mining conference, the firm’s production was about 8.75 million carats for 2022.
Between 2022 and 2027, Endiama intends to more than double its diamond production to 17.5 million carats.
In September 2022, Bloomberg News reported that Angola was looking to sell its 30% stake in Sonangol within the next five years.
A new list names the Jwaneng diamond mine, in Botswana, as the world’s richest diamond mine.
A new list by miningintelligence.com, quoted by IDEX Online, names the Jwaneng diamond mine, in Botswana, as the world’s richest diamond mine for the first three quarters of 2022. Jwaneng produced 10.3 million carats in 2022.
Orapa, also in Botswana, came second with 8 million carats. Both Jwaneng and Orapa are operated by Debswana, a partnership between De Beers and the government of Botswana. Jwaneng and Orapa were also listed as the two highest value diamond mines in the world, estimated at $1.25 billion and $976 million respectively, “based on average historic annualized prices of $121.5 per carat,” according to the report.
Alrrosa’s Udachny mine came third. Although Alrosa has not published production figures since the war with Ukraine, miningintelligence.com bases its conclusion on the mine’s 2021 production of 4.6 million carats. Fourth comes the Venetia mine in South Africa 4.6m carats, operated by De Beers. In fifth is Nyurba, in Russia, with 3.6 million carats, based on 2021 numbers.
De Beers has made sharp price changes at this week’s sight, implementing deep reductions in larger goods and increases for smaller stones.
Prices fell by as much as 10% in 2-carat rough and above, with lower-quality items seeing the most significant drops, sources told Rapaport News Monday on condition of anonymity. Prices of diamonds under 0.75 carats rose by similar percentages, reflecting a market split that has persisted since late last year, insiders said. Sizes in between saw more modest declines.
“There have been quite wild increases and decreases,” one source said. “Not to say that they’re not justified, but it’s interesting that they’ve done that.”
De Beers declined to comment.
The adjustments follow months of sluggishness in larger, lower-quality rough as Chinese demand slumped during the country’s Covid-19 outbreaks and inflation dented mid-market US spending. Stones in the 3-grainer category and below have remained relatively strong due to steady sales of polished melee and Indian manufacturers’ efforts to fill factories with cheaper material.
De Beers kept its prices firm throughout 2022 despite the weakness in the larger categories, which constitute a significant proportion of its sales. This impacted profit margins at cutting firms, many of which perceived the miner’s rough to be expensive, insiders explained.
“These are the prices [at] which they should have been selling since October,” a sightholder commented. “It’s aligning with reality [rather than] reflecting a relatively poor end of year.”
De Beers is known for its reluctance to reduce prices during downturns, as was the case during the Covid-19 crisis. Now, as then, it has waited for a slight improvement in trading before taking action. China’s reopening has boosted sentiment, while the recent US holiday period was satisfactory, albeit slower than 2021’s record season.
The first sight of 2023, which runs Monday to Friday, comes amid uncertainty about the global economic situation, the Russia-Ukraine crisis, and the prospects for the Chinese New Year, which occurs on January 22.
It’s also a time of transition at De Beers, which is welcoming a new CEO, Al Cook, to succeed Bruce Cleaver on February 20 and is in the middle of negotiations with the Botswana government over an updated sales deal.
“Generally, things are a bit better than they were four or five months back, but that is because of low [polished] production, not because of an improvement of the market,” a manufacturing executive commented. “So the challenges remain.”
The world’s richest diamond mine for the first three quarters of 2022 was Jwaneng, in Botswana, with 10.3m carats.
Orapa, also in Botswana, was second-placed with 8.0m carats, according to newly-published figures from miningintelligence.com.
Both mines are operated by Debswana, a partnership between De Beers and the government of Botswana.
Third on the list is Udachny mine, operated by Alrosa, the sanctioned Russian miner. The 4.6m-carat figure is based on its 2021 production, assuming trends since 2019 continued.
Fourth is the Venetia mine, in South Africa (4.6m carats), operated by De Beers and fifth is Nyurba, in Russia, with 3.6m carats (with same caveat as for Udachny).
Jwaneng and Orapa are also listed as the two highest value diamond mines, estimated at $1.25bn and $976m, both based on average historic annualized prices of $121.5 per carat.
Jefferson Ncube, an illegal diamond miner from Zimbabwe, works on his latest tunnel at an abandoned De Beers mine near Kleinzee, South Africa.
Bracing against the vibrations of the jackhammer, illicit diamond miner Jefferson Ncube bores steadily into the rock face before him, sending chunks of dry stone clattering to the ground and filling the air with a cloud of pale gray dust. He’s 30 feet below the surface of the desert in the Namaqualand region of South Africa in a tunnel barely tall enough to crawl through.
“I don’t enjoy this at all, but I need the money,” says Ncube, who holds a degree in agricultural science from the University of Pretoria but says he has been unable to find work elsewhere. “I have a family to support, a wife and a 1-year-old child.”
The Nuttabooimine, near the coastal town of Kleinzee, was once mined by the diamond giant, De Beers, the largest of dozens of industrial mining operators who, for the best part of a century, formed the backbone of the region’s economy.
A diamond miner hauls up a bucket of gravel at an illegal mining site in South Africa’s Northern Cape Province.
But over the past 20 years, rising operational costs and a dwindling supply of diamonds have made large-scale industrial mining increasingly unviable. The sector’s steady decline has left a legacy of chronic unemployment in Namaqualand but has also created opportunities for a growing number of desperate young men and women willing to tolerate hardships and dangers as they eke out a living in abandoned mines.
Known locally as “zama-zamas” — loosely, “ones who try their luck” in isiZulu — unlicensed miners like Ncube are considered illegal by the government. Yet here on South Africa’s wild and diamond-rich Atlantic coast, residents say the number of zama-zamas has burgeoned in recent years, fueled by the lack of jobs, the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the rising cost of living, as well as by political and economic crises in neighboring countries.
An ilegal diamond miner breaks up rocks at the Nuttabooi mine near Kleinzee, South Africa.
Earlier this year, South Africa’s minister of Mineral Resources and Energy, Gwede Mantashe, described illegal mining as a “plague” amid reports of rampant corruption, extortion and violence linked to zama-zama activity across the country, not only in relation to diamonds but also coal, and other minerals such as gold and chromite. Once confined largely to the country’s estimated 6,100 abandoned or ownerless mines, officials say illegal mining is increasingly spilling over into operational mines too.
Ncube is part of a 12-man team, all of them migrants from Zimbabwe, where hyperinflation and unemployment have made it all but impossible to build a stable life for their families. Out in the desert, living conditions are bleak and working conditions even worse, but with some basic tools and a little knowledge of geology, they manage to make ends meet. The men, almost all of whom have arrived in the past two years, share the work and split whatever profits they make.
Members of an illegal diamond mining collective look down a mineshaft at the Nuttabooi mine.
“We dig down until we hit the bedrock, then we go sideways through this belt,” says Ncube, pointing at a band of rock and gravel on the side wall of the tunnel. “This is where we find the diamonds. In the past, they used hammers and chisels. But if you use a jackhammer, you can take out more rock and then there are more diamonds for you.”
Danger in the tunnels
A zama-zama uses a jackhammer to break up rock in an abandoned De Beers mine.
The miners have little in the way of safety equipment, and their tunnels are prone to collapsing. A little more than half a mile from here, at the neighboring Bontekoe mine, a simple granite plaque in the desert commemorates the miners who lost their lives in a particularly deadly collapse in 2012. Smaller accidents occur frequently and often go unreported. Community leaders say that at least six people have died at Nuttabooi alone in the past few months.
To try to stay safe, Ncube and his colleagues make a point of leaving “pillars” at 6-foot intervals as they tunnel through the ground. But it’s an imperfect system, made harder by the fact that tunnels dug by different groups of miners often collide.
An illegal diamond miner looks out from the top of a De Beers mine that has since been taken over by zama-zamas.
“If the hole is ‘paying,’ people get greedy and they eat away at the pillars until the whole thing is just hanging,” says Ncube. “That’s how some guys died just two holes away from here. If you get greedy you’ll die down here, and then your family will suffer even more.”
After handing over to a colleague, Ncube climbs carefully back up the vertical mine shaft and hauls himself over the edge. At the surface, in a stark, lunar landscape of craters and piles of rubble, zama-zamas cluster together around their holes, sifting through gravel and chatting over the low hum of diesel generators. A few hundred yards away, the old De Beers mine lies abandoned, a massive scar on the face of the desert, hemmed in by towering mine dumps.
“De Beers has taken all the diamonds out of Namaqualand and now we’re back in poverty,” says Andrew Cloete, a longtime illicit miner who lives in a small tent of black and red plastic sheeting in the ever-expanding squatter camp below the Nuttabooi mine. “The companies left us like they found us — with nothing. But if we just sit there thinking about it, our kids will die. So we, the diggers, come in here and take the scraps.”
Andrew Cloete, a diamond miner and activist for mining rights, photographed in his shack in a squatter camp at the Nuttabooi mine in Namaqualand, South Africa. The government considers the activity at Nuttabooi illegal because the miners do not possess permits.
The plight of the zama-zamas
There is a palpable sense of anger, particularly among the miners who grew up in Namaqualand, over how little of the region’s diamond wealth has stayed in the local area. Over several decades, vast quantities of diamonds have been exported overseas, yet most of the area’s roads are still unpaved, service provision is haphazard at best and poverty and alcoholism are endemic. Unemployment in the province stands at over 46%.
“Africa’s f***ed up. We don’t have jobs, all we have is minerals — but they’re being looted by the West,” said one miner, an unemployed mechanical engineer who didn’t want to be named, citing concerns that he may be targeted by the authorities. “This is our Africa. This is our land. These are our minerals.”
Zama-zamas have little bargaining power and are forced to sell their finds to black-market buyers for a fraction of their true value.
Outside Cloete’s tent, men wander through a small city of plastic lean-tos that has sprung up in the desert over the past two years. The camp has enveloped a handful of derelict buildings left behind by the mining companies, where zama-zamas now sleep side by side on filthy mattresses on the floor. The camp, home to around 1,500 people, has no electricity, running water, clinics or sanitation but a surplus of bars and taverns that do a steady round-the-clock trade.
“Nobody would live in conditions like this if there wasn’t a need,” says Cloete, gesturing toward the scene outside. “We’re here because of poverty, hunger and joblessness.”
They’re not getting rich off their diamonds
Diamond miners at an illegal dig site in Namaqualand, South Africa.
After lighting a cigarette, Cloete reaches for a small glass jar and takes out a plastic packet from inside. Carefully, he empties its contents into his palm. About a dozen small, rough diamonds tumble out. On international markets they might fetch a substantial sum, he says, but due to the illegal nature of their work, the zama-zamas have little bargaining power and are forced to sell their finds to black-market buyers for a fraction of their true value.
“They buy diamonds like they’re buying sweets,” complained one zama-zama. “You get people buying diamonds for 100 Rand [about $5.50].”
Cloete, who founded an informal group of mineral rights activists known as the “Mining Fighters,” has spent years petitioning the South African government to find a productive way to formalize zama-zama mining, a move that he says would lead to safer working conditions and a fairer marketplace for local diamonds, as well as bringing in considerable revenue for the government. Similar systems are in place in many other African countries, where so-called artisanal mining, carried out by individuals or small groups using traditional methods and basic equipment, is now a major employer and revenue generator.
A swimming pool lies empty in the town of Kleinzee in the Namaqualand region of South Africa.
The town was once the property of the De Beers diamond company. In its heyday, it was a thriving settlement of 4,000 people with about 30 recreational clubs. After closing down its mines in the region, De Beers sold off the town, which is now largely empty.
But Cloete says he has yet to receive a response. “They treat us like we’re criminals,” he says.
Many in the formal diamond sector would also like to see the legalization and regulation of informal mining, which they say hampers their legal operations and fuels a parallel black market in illegal diamonds.
“At the end of the day, it’s a situation that’s totally unbearable for us,” said Gert Van Niekerk, chairman of the South African Diamond Producers Organisation, an industry body representing legal diamond miners. “This is not the Wild West.”
Kim Cupito
Kim Cupito, who lives with her husband in a derelict building left behind by De Beers, lost her job during the pandemic. “We need to survive, and this is God’s ground. It’s for everybody,” she says.
In Kleinzee, a faded mining town once owned by De Beers, where most homes now lie empty, residents say the influx of illegal miners from around South Africa and neighboring countries has led to a rise in crime.
The uncertain future faced by zama-zamas
“Zama-zamas aren’t welcome here,” said one Kleinzee restaurateur. “They have knives, they have guns, they’re gangsters. They can come and buy things here, but afterward they must leave. We don’t want them here.”
Illegal diamond miners try to get phone reception at a mining site in Namaqualand, South Africa.
In a policy document released in March, South Africa’s Department of Mineral Resources and Energy announced its intention to create a new police unit dedicated to combating illegal mining. It also laid out plans to make it easier for artisanal and small-scale miners to legally acquire mining rights by streamlining the expensive and time-consuming process of applying for a permit.
Police raids are frequent. In one major operation in July, a combined force of police and other law enforcement bodies backed by two helicopters and a spotter plane raided the Nuttabooi site, arresting over 100 people and confiscating 130 generators and 121 jackhammers, along with other equipment. But within days, mining activity had resumed.
But creating new legislation to support the policies could take time. And critics say it’s unrealistic to hope that many zama-zamas will voluntarily cease their activities, undergo training, comply with regulations and start paying taxes and royalties to the government, especially given that many are in the country illegally and would not be eligible for mining permits.
In the meantime, Namaqualand’s zama-zamas don’t intend to wait around.
“There’s nothing for us out there,” said Kim Cupito, a former fruit trader who lost her job during the pandemic and now lives with her husband in a derelict De Beers building with gravel piled up in the hallways and gaping holes in the roof. “We need to survive, and this is God’s ground. It’s for everybody.”
A portrayal of De Beers’ operations past and present.
Bruce Cleaver reflects on the changes that took effect in the six years he headed the diamond company.
RAPAPORT… Bruce Cleaver had a very focused “to do” list when he took over as De Beers CEO in July 2016. Having previously worked on strategy and business development at the company, as well as at parent Anglo American, he recognized De Beers’ need to evolve, and to protect it from the increasing volatility evident in the global economy and diamond market.
“I wanted to build a more sustainable business; one that was less prone to economic cycles,” Cleaver stresses in an interview with Rapaport News. “I wanted to ensure we’d never get caught in the position we had in 2008 when we hit a very serious downturn and our balance sheet was very stretched.”
Bruce Cleaver
He never imagined those goals would be challenged by a global pandemic and a war in Ukraine that has brought sanctions on Russian diamonds — approximately one-third of global rough supply. These aren’t events you predict in your risk analysis, he notes.
In contrast to 2008, when De Beers had to take on more debt to weather the financial crisis, the company emerged from Covid-19 stronger than before, and it may even have benefited from the limitations on Russia-based Alrosa — its biggest competitor. The $491 million in underlying earnings it reported in the first six months of 2022 was its best half-year profit since 2011, and the $3.54 billion in revenue its highest since 2014 (see graph).
But Cleaver looks beyond the financials as he reflects on his tenure at the helm of the world’s largest diamond company. His six-and-a-half-year stint brought a significant transformation to De Beers’ structure, brand positioning, messaging, and relationships, all of which he believes demonstrate transparency and a willingness to change that were not always evident at the company.
Call to collaborate
His first public statement after being appointed to the position called for greater cooperation and partnerships within the trade. He actively sought to ease the tension that often stood between De Beers and sightholders and at times its government partners, he admits.
“It was important for us to show people we would change, listen more and collaborate more,” he reflects. “I do feel there is much more trust now than before, and a sense of working toward a common goal — that we can agree to disagree in a more friendly way.”
Central to achieving that was the refurbishment of the sightholder application process, which he concedes had previously been complicated and intimidating. The current system further demonstrates De Beers’ willingness to be more open and transparent, Cleaver insists. It’s a complicated task, he adds, considering the company distributes some 33 million carats a year and must set criteria to award goods to certain people and not to others.
The sheer volume of De Beers’ production means the company is unlikely to shift away from the sight system any time soon. However, it did tweak its distribution at the beginning of 2022 to provide more bespoke supply by classifying sightholders according to their business type: manufacturer, dealer, or retailer. The move was seen as an attempt to reduce the flipping of boxes on the secondary market and to bring more efficiency to the supply chain.
Special stones to sell
There has been speculation that the Botswana government — a 15% shareholder in De Beers and a joint venture partner in its mining and selling distribution businesses — is pressuring the miner to sell its specials through the parastatal Okavango Diamond Company, in vertically integrated deals with manufacturers. The two are currently negotiating a new 10-year supply deal and the renewal of De Beers’ mining licenses in the southern African country.
Structuring supply in such a way would see the company (and government) take a share of profit from the sale of the resulting polished. Smaller companies have struck similar partnerships, such as Lucara Diamond Corp.’s agreement to sell its 10.8-carat-plus rough through manufacturer HB Antwerp.
Cleaver notes the deeper considerations with which De Beers must contend. “It’s a whole different ball game selling 33 million carats a year than 50,000 carats. We have an offering that we must sort, value, sell, trace and track on a completely different scale,” he points out. “You have to be much more sophisticated, more thoughtful and have a much stronger balance sheet.”
That’s not to say the company is set in its ways, particularly regarding how it sells specials. Last year, it partnered with sightholder Diacore to buy an exceptional 39.35-carat blue rough stone from Petra Diamonds for $40.2 million and share in the profit from the polished. The De Beers Blue, the 15.10-carat, fancy-vivid-blue polished that resulted from that rough, fetched $58.7 million at Sotheby’s Hong Kong. The two companies also teamed up to buy five blue rough diamonds from Petra in 2020, with the resulting polished stones expected to garner over $70 million at Sotheby’s in November (after press time) and December.
“It’s not difficult as a seller of a small volume of goods to find one buyer who will buy one particular stone at a significant premium to the market — that happens to us all the time,” he adds. “We just don’t publicize it.”
Tech at play
Technology has been the central tool to improve the way De Beers sells rough, Cleaver underlines. He teases that the company will introduce various innovations in the next 12 to 18 months that will be “game changers in how we continue to sell in this evolving market,” but he declined to reveal further information about these developments.
Data is also playing a much more important role in enabling De Beers, and others, to make more rapid decisions than before — and that data-centric strategy is being driven by technology, he notes.
In fact, technology is influencing change across all De Beers business units, Cleaver says. That includes at its mining operations, where it is tackling the challenge to “mine more gently,” using less water and energy to be more environmentally friendly. He also highlights the Tracr program — De Beers’ blockchain-driven traceability platform — which is gaining traction and will enable companies to show the provenance of their De Beers supply.
Building forever
That all feeds into the strong focus on sustainability that De Beers has adopted in recent years and the need to show one’s diamond is ethically sourced. While Cleaver recognized the need to talk about sustainability early in his tenure as CEO, the rapidness with which the subject became a focal point for brands surprised even him.
“I wanted to make sustainability a bigger issue, but I don’t think I realized at the beginning just how important it is,” he admits. “Now ‘Building Forever’ is an absolutely key part of everything we do.”
Building Forever outlines 12 goals De Beers has set to achieve by 2030, encompassing four areas it has identified to make a meaningful impact.
Those are leading ethical practices, partnering for thriving communities, protecting the natural world, and accelerating equal opportunity. “These are vitally important not only to our business, but also to our employees, partners and communities across all facets of our operations,” the company emphasizes on its website.
The program gradually emerged as the core message of the De Beers brand, taking its cues from the rising awareness among millennials and Gen-Zers on issues such as carbon neutrality, climate change, and social upliftment. The program is what distinguishes De Beers, and it provides an opportunity to maximize the value of the brand that was not apparent five years ago, Cleaver says.
Cleaning the mess
The evolution of that message paralleled Cleaver’s advocating for more brands across the industry as well as cleaning up and strengthening the De Beers brand. Key to that development was taking full ownership of its name in early 2017, when it bought the 50% of De Beers Diamond Jewellers (DBDJ) that was owned by LVMH.
“It always felt messy having the De Beers name co-owned by someone else,” he observes. “I’m very pleased we’ve been able to unify the brands into one master brand.”
The company sought to leverage its strong name recognition as much as possible. Most notably that played out at retail with the LVMH deal and subsequently renaming the retail operation De Beers Jewellers (DBJ). It also rebranded Forevermark as De Beers Forevermark, and the strategy extended beyond its retail operations to align the whole group into one “De Beers” corporate identity with a common goal.
“I wanted to define a more holistic business strategy: to run the company as one business rather than three separate silos,” Cleaver shares. “I think we’ve been pretty successful in achieving that.”
Staying brilliant
De Beers previously had a more vertical structure, split between the pillars of mining, rough sales and its retail brands. Over the past half decade, it has morphed into a more integrated end-to-end business with every employee, regardless of which area of the company they work, having the same stated purpose: to “make life brilliant,” Cleaver explains.
As such, the outgoing CEO carefully defines De Beers as a “natural-diamond company” with an integrated structure that encompasses exploration, mining, rough sales, and retail brands. Lightbox, the company’s lab-grown business, is considered an “adjacency” that doesn’t fit into the core business model, he insists.
With that structure in place, Cleaver is confident the company can double-down on innovation – as he claims it did with Tracr and Lightbox — strengthen its relationships with the trade and government, and in doing so, lead the industry on big issues such as sustainability. He hopes to continue to influence that path in his new role as cochairman, through which he will take an active role in engaging with external stakeholders.
“It’s important that De Beers pushes agendas and ideas that might be surprising they came from a big organization,” Cleaver discloses. “But when you look at some of the sustainability work done by retailers and sightholders today, it’s fantastic, and I think that we did have some small influence on that — that was all deliberate.”
The industry will continue to evolve because the world will continue to change quickly, he continues. “I’ve tried hard to always think about what the next trend or the next move should be — and why shouldn’t it be us who makes them? We recognize that when De Beers talks, people do listen,” he concludes.
